Verify. Don't trust.
Every privacy claim Siphr makes is something you can check yourself. This page is the machine-readable version of that promise. Open a terminal; nothing on the next page is asked to be taken on faith.
The source you can run is the source we ship
The build hash on siphr.dev matches the one produced from a clean checkout of this commit, on your own machine.
The server only stores ciphertext
Hit any object endpoint with a fresh session. Decryptors are client-side; the responses contain no plaintext for private repos.
Public keys are stored per-user, never shared
Every public key Siphr accepts is bound to a username. The encrypted identity blob is uploaded once and never re-derived server-side.
What we wrote in the code is what runs
Open source, AGPL-3.0. The privacy policy is what the code does, not what we promise. PRs against the crypto primitives are public review.
Verifiability covers what the server stores and what the code does. It does not cover the device you decrypt on. If your laptop is compromised, the threat model leaks. We can't transparency-log our way out of that — but we'll say it loudly here so you don't think we tried.